Abstract-Recently, the usage of mobile phones around the world is growing more and more. Short Message Service (SMS) is one of the most important applications due to its easy way to send and receive messages from users to users. There have been many transmission protocols aiming to make sure secure and effective transferring in the SMS. Some of them are based on symmetric algorithms, while others are based on signature encryption or public key infrastructure. However, all of these existing protocols lack sufficient security or high efficiency. When the protocols possess high security margin, they usually have a limited performance in software. And when the performance is guaranteed, the security margin usually decreases. So in this paper, we study the advantages and disadvantages of some widely-used protocols. Basing on this, we propose a new protocol for secure SMS transmission. Our protocol improves both the structure and the modules of previous protocols from theoretical and practical aspects, so that it can assure the security level as well as very efficient performance. Compared with other protocols having similar security, our protocol has a more convenient implementation. Compared with other protocols with similar performance, our protocol is safer. Also, we use a signature model which does not need the PKI on-line, increasing the security greatly. Finally, we take experiments on real mobile phones to verify our protocol and analyze the results.
I. INTRODUCTION
The short message service (SMS) is developed by 3rdgeneration partnership project 2 (3GPP2) in 2005 for a latest version. SMS can transfer text with 160 characters, numeric information for messaging and other typical application. For example, it is to notify the voice mail message to the mobile phone users, notify the query results to the sales staff, and inform the emergency situation of the patients to the doctor.
There are several properties distributed among the SMS MC (message center) and the wireless system, including message entry features, message transmission capabilities and administration features. The MC could be integrated in the wireless system. Or it could be settled separately.
MC consists of many properties. For example, it includes proper selections and message access protocols for link in entry, and DTMP reception for checking in entry for mobile phone. It also includes reply hints for customized data terminal station. One can input the message through a key board or display screen. In addition, common voice information and signal from the mobile station can be applied to call the SMS center for inputting a message by the subscribers using wireless voice services.
The SMS supports the exchange short messages from a wireless system to a mobile center, or in the contrast. It also supports the same function between other external installation and the wireless center. These external installations are able to deliver or take over the messages that are not very long selectively. As we mentioned before, all data terminal stations, mobile phones or message access systems can be regarded as the external installations. SMS is the use of global system for mobile communications (GSM), a service which allows one to send out up to 160 characters. GSM and SMS services are mainly applied in Europe. SMS does not require the mobile phones in a certain range, and the message will keep a few days until the phone open in a certain field. The SMS message can be sent to anyone in the same network or with a roaming capability. It also can be sent to a digital phone equipped with a PC link, or from a digital phone to another digital telephone.
Usually, a text can contain up to 160 alphanumeric characters. However, the use of data compression can send at least 50% longer than the standard text. As the first stage of the development of global standards for digital mobile telephone system, short messages exchange between two mobile or fixed equipment. The short message is stored and sent by the SMS MC, and can be received by the receiver even the mobile device is not open.SMS compression increases the text size, and the short messages are connected together to form a longer message. Sometimes short message can be called instant messages (IM).
SMS transformation just provides the data to clients with the voice information by the wireless service providers. Also SMS-only service can be offered even if the providers do not have other data or voice transformation abilities.
SMS transformation is just provided to the data clients with the voice information by the wireless service providers. Also SMS-only service can be offered even if the providers do not have other data or voice transformation abilities.
Besides of above, the standard of broadcast of messages is also widely accepted now. One can send or receive the broadcast message by a CDMA channel for the usable mobile centers. Notice that the broadcast message is not admitted by the mobile center.
The widely applications of SMS in different scenes suggest pressing security concerns. Most of these applications relate to highly sensitive data, such as information about money transfer and mobile payment. So we need to protect the abuse of it, at least we should minimize the risks for using it. In the decades, many researchers focus on various security means, for example, data integrity, confidentiality and authenticity, as well as other security concepts during the process of message transferring. Especially, the SMS protocol plays a very important role in the message transmission. But in the specification for the standard of SMS [1] , these security issues do not mention sufficiently.
Currently, the authors in [2] have pointed that the widespread accepted mobile infrastructures including Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) are not safe, according to the alternative mobile security services due to some kinds of flaws. Except of these flaws, the authors in [3] showed that the tempering actions (for example, phishing) should be avoided through some essential client-side security methods. Also, the KASUMI cryptosystem used in GSM and 3G telephony is theoretically broken by the authors in [4] and [5] . The authors applied related-key cryptanalysis technique to analyze the full rounds of KASUMI, with a practical time complexity. The weakness of its compatibility with GSM was studied by Ahmadian et al. in [6] . Luckily, some of the problems related to GSM are partly solved by the authors of [7] based on the Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS), while other problems remain unsolved. In [8] the authors presented that there is some kind of unauthorized access to the information within the database of the mobile centers and the clients' devices. The building of the other security layer and basic mobile construction progresses due to the security focus. This is needed according to the different security requirements for different purposes. Besides of its firmness, this layer should be able to exploit the features taken by the construction of efficiency, flexibility and sound cost.
Previous works about the SMS protocols and their security are as follows. From SMSC to the client mobile phone, the short message is transferred through the Signaling System Number 7 (SS7) according to the framework of Mobile Application Part (GSM MAP) [9] .
However, this is a protocol that is not encrypted and allows one in the range of cellular network to read the information in SS7 and modify the short message. Also, the authors in [9] also pointed that the payload is dependent on different providers. The payload is the content of message which shows on the clients' mobile phones. The size can be 140 characters with 8-bit, or 160 characters with 7-bit.
In [10] , the authors believed that basic security services are not offered by the network of GSM. These security services contain end-to-end security, inability to being copied, authentication and the anonymity.
As we know, encryption is a useful method for improving the security in SMS, even though the encryption is not allowed in many countries. Two cryptography algorithms aiming at GSM security were A5/1 or A5/2, both are block ciphers. A5/1 has a 64-bit master key and A5/2 has a 16-bit master key. In [11] , the authors broke the A5/1 with a practical time complexity, and they showed that the master key of A5/1 can be guessed in several minutes in a PC. The authors also claimed that A5/2 is not secure at all.
Security flaws are also caused due to lack of protection of the interface between SMSC and the Authentication Source (AS). Usually, the mobile operator is not responsible for the security of the connection between the SMSC and the AS. In [12] the authors pointed that the connections between the cellular network and the internet bring other purposes which have an impact on the loyalty for the providers.
There are other protocols, such as National Marine Electronics, Association (NMEA 0183), Trimble Standard Interface Protocol (TSIP), DGPS (RTCM) [13] . NMEA 0183 is a standardized protocol for transferring information from GPS to the client computers.
A method for transmitting messages is presented by the Tele-service, which is equal to the TIA/EIA/IS-91 Extended Protocol Enhanced Services [14] . This protocol allows sending mobile-end messages and is for point-topoint usage. Another extension of Tele-service is for the Voice Mail Notification (VMN) which is able to compatible with the protocol of TIA/EIA/IS-91. This protocol improves some previous properties and make sure that a more secure SMS transferring and stable Voice Mail Status, which is also point-to-point [15] .
A. Our Contribution
In this paper, we carefully study previous protocols for the transmission layer of SMS. Some of these protocols focus on the performance of transmission, while others focus on the security. However, both of these two characters should be fully considered and made a tradeoff between each other. We compare and summarize the advantages and disadvantages of previous protocols, and try to figure out why they possess such manners. Then we originally propose a new protocol which is supposed to be applied for secure SMS transmission between the server-side and the client-side. Moreover, we give out two variants of our protocol. One is based on a previous security framework especially is suitable for preventing from risks for SMS-oriented applications. Also we design new modules and put different algorithms into this framework. What we do brings a higher security level and significant performance improvement. The other one is based on a similar framework, but we modify this framework to make it more reasonable and sound. Again we apply different algorithms in this modified framework. With the algorithms we choose, the encryption process is carried out with high efficiency.
The authors in [9] and [16] did a similar work before. However, a fatal weakness of the previous scheme is that the client-side to serve-side encryption between the receiver and the sender cannot be guaranteed due to the decryption mode of the cellular network. Also, this scheme exploits another one-time pad to encrypt SMS messages, which is created to decrypt the message through the receivers. Some kinds of dependency on the internet infrastructure exist because the received data is decrypted during the cellular network. Unlike previous proposals, what we design is to improve not only the framework but also the used algorithms. We firstly try to use some lightweight block ciphers in the proposal which raise the efficiency greatly and still keep high security margin.
Most of the previous algorithms used in SMS protocols are based on the public key cryptosystem [17] [18] , while ours is based on the secret key cryptosystem. Compared to the algorithms based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [19] , our method obviously needs much less running time, less storage and lower requirements for devices.
Finally, we analyze our proposal from the points of both the security and the efficiency. We discuss them from theoretical and practical aspects. We explain why our proposals are more secure from the structures and the modules in them. Also, we perform our schemes in software so that we can give explicit results about their performances. The experimental results are also compared with existing work in the literature.
B. The Organization
In Section 2, we introduce the background theory and related work about the previous SMS protocols, including some detailed structure and analysis for the widely used protocols. In Section 3, we propose our protocols for secure and efficient SMS transmission, including the construction, the steps and the flow chart. We also discuss the modules and algorithms in our protocols in this section. In Section 4, we analyze the security of the protocols, from the theory and the experiments. By experimental data we confirm our theoretical prediction. In Section 5, the performance and efficiency of our protocols are discussed, and the results are compared with other protocols. Section 6 concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we give the detailed description about previous protocols for SMS transmission that are thought to have a certain extent of security. We introduce the basic framework and related cryptographic services, including some background theory and the limitations.
A. Structure of SMS Message
The structure of SMS message is made up by two main parts: the header and the payload. The header contains the instructions to air interface, the instructions to SMSC, the instructions to handset, and the instructions to SIM [20] . The instructions to SIM are usually optional. The payload is the content of the message. As we mention before, the maximal size of the payload is up to 160 characters (a byte for a character). The header uses these four characters to determine the length of the payload and the metadata. The structure is as Figure. 
B. Security Issues About GSM Network
The GSM network, which receives the SMS message, does not offer sufficient security assurances, such as the end-to-end security, the authentication, the anonymity for users, and the non-repudiation [21] . The data integrity, availability and the confidentiality are intimidated so that offering a safe service for any kinds of communication for any kinds of network is an important problem, both for wireless and for cable transmission.
C. The Package of WMA
WMA is an optional package for J2ME that helps the developers of different applications to finish the applications, which can receive and send the SMS message. It includes the part of message connection and message listener. The message contains the text message and the binary message. We introduce them briefly as below.
 Binary message: a sub-interface that offers approaches to send and receive the binary payload and message  Text message: similar as above, only for text payload and message  Message: this is important for the communication with WMA, meaning that the message is consumed and produced, received and sent.  Message listener: this is to realize the nonsynchronous information of objects of message.  Message connection: This is a sub-interface which offers functions to send and create message. This interface also can be used to create a proper message type. As we mentioned before, none of above modules contains protection mechanism for the integrity and the confidentiality of the message during the process of transmission, such as decryption or encryption methods.
One of the solutions for this situation is to use the granted allowance. However, for the operations in this context, the granted allowance cannot guarantee the confidentiality. But some standards still agree on the same security requirements and need the application being granted with an allowance to operate the messages. Usually, the security is assured by the specified information and corresponding mechanism by the developers, if the security requirements of the content are high.
Corresponding to the specific secure communication, the related software support is needed so that the clientend of SMS can communicate with the server-end.
D. Cryptographic Schemes for Sms Commuication Protocols
There are many cryptographic schemes for secure SMS-based communicational transmission. We focus on the protocols exploiting PKI models.
In all of these models, the IB (Identity-Based) is to lower the load of a PKI model, and this model is firstly introduced by Shamir in 1984. As the most widely used solution, the Identity-Based cryptosystem has its advantages. First, the private keys are distributed through the trusted authenticated center, which is called the KGC (key generation center). Sometimes we call it TA (trust authority). Secondly, the user can choose the public keys freely. So we can save the requirement of certificating all the users by choosing the identities of users as their public keys. The disadvantage is that the original Identity-Based cryptosystem build the key escrow construction implicitly. Since the key generation center has the capability to get confidential information from any users, they can be personalized.
There are three main kinds of schemes. First is the SC (self-certified) scheme. The feature of this scheme is to split the private key into two parts. So the key contract can be protected. Note that the self-certified scheme does not provide the "encryption into the future" feature, so that it will not suffer the DoD attacks. In this condition, partial Identity-based private key is got from the entity of KGC, without publishing or generating the public keys.
Another scheme is the non-certificate cryptography (CL), which was proposed by Al-Rivami in 2003 for solving the key contract without applying the certificates for the PKI. For many different mobile situation (Manets and Ad Hoc, and so on), this example is exploited usually. The main advantage of CL is the same as the SC scheme. That is dividing the private key into two parts. One is the common non-certified partial key, which is transparent to KGC. The other is the partial IB key which is generated by the KGC. The main difference between CL and SC is that CL has the property of "encryption into the future", while the SC does not have this property. This means that in the CL scheme, exposing the public keys for application is permissible even the partial IB key hasn't been got from the KGC. In the latter situation, the message is needed to be decrypted.
The third is the framework called SMSCrypto, which highly relates to our new scheme in this paper. This scheme uses the model called BSS, which was proposed by Baek et al. in 2005. Note that this is a minor modified version of CL, so the DoD attacks are also invalid to it. This also removes some limitation and flaws for the IBE and the full PKI model. Another similar CL-related protocol is called BDCPS which was proposed by Barreto et al in 2008. As we know, this is the optimal option in the term of efficiency, especially for offering a combination of secure digital signature and encryption algorithm. The detailed scenario of SMSCrypto is as Figure. 2.
As we see, the mobile network contains several main kinds of connection: secure SMS communication between two users; secure SMS communication between the user and the application server. It also contains several gateways and semi-trusted entity. Offering the security from users to users for various applications of SMS is the main purpose of this framework. It builds a secure communication channel from end to end, and makes sure that the private information does not leak. Safe connection between different users and the server is guaranteed by Fig. 2 . Each user and the provider service have their own identification. This identification could be the email account or the personal mobile number.
The framework exploits the trusted third party for the parameters of the system safety. However, the participation into the procedure of the monitoring of a conversation is inhibitive once the setup has begun. Usually this party is regarded as a semi-trusted entity, or called as a ticket boot. 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we introduce the structure of our protocol, including the procedure, the flow chart of the protocol, as well as the detailed steps and specified modules.
A. Basic Internet Structure of Our Protocol
The involved entities of our protocol are as Figure. 3. In Figure. 3, SMS-GMSC represents the MSC gateway when the short message is transferred from SC to MS. SMS-IWMSC represents the gateway when the message is transmitted from MS to SC. When the transmission of the short message is implemented by GPRS, we exploit the serving GPRS support node (SGSN) to replace the MSC. The basic internet structure is as Figure. For short messages of the final mobile center, SMSC sends the message to SMSGMSC, and SMSGMSC obtains the message by enquiring for HLR and VLR. The necessary routine information then continues to send the message, and send messages to related MSC. Once other network is required, the MSC sends messages to the MS once again. Reading and writing the address are also needed in this process.
B. Functions of the Entitiies
Function of SC The SC can send a short message to MS until the report has been received or the period of validity has expired. The report can be received from PLMN, and the message can be received from MS. Based on the short messages previously received, a report is returned to PLMN.
Function of MS The MS can submit a message to TP-DU until the report has been received or the period of time has expired. It can receive the short message TPDU from SC. Also based on the short messages previously received, a sending report is returned to the network. It can receive the report from the network. It can inform the network memorizer about the current ability. It can receive one or multiple messages. When a previous message sent to the same destination from MS is replaced by another message, it can inform the SC.
Function of MSC When receiving a short message TPDU from the MS, MSC is responsible for the following operations: receiving a short message TPDU; obtaining the MSISDN or error messages of MS from the VLR; returning proper error messages in the fault report of MS (if the VLR indicates an error); checking the parameters of TPDU (if the VLR indicates no error); returning appropriate error messages in the fault report to MS (if the parameter is incorrect); checking the address of the destination (if the parameter is correct); retransmission of the short message TPDU to SMS-IWMSC; continuing to send reports from MSC to MS (when receiving the short message report from SMS-IWMSC).
When receiving a short message TPDU from the GMSC, MSC is responsible for the following operations: receiving a short message TPDU; receiving the relevant information from the VLR, such as location area address, an appropriate error message; returning an appropriate error message in the fault report to SMS-GMSC (if VLR indicates some errors); sending a short message to MS (if VLR indicates no errors); sending confirmation information to SMS-GMSC in the sending report(when receiving the confirmed information that indicates the short message has been received); returning proper error messages to SMS-GMSC in the fault report (when the fault report indicates that MS doesn't receive the short message);
When a message is sent to the MS or the MT-SMS which is in a busy situation, the MSC can choose to be temporarily stored the TPDU in the queue. The storage of the message queue is related to the maximal response time and the allowable delay time for the MSC and SMS-GMSC.
When the MS is recovered, the stored TPDU is sent to MSO according to the order of first-in-first-out (FIFO). If the MS does not receive the message in an allowable time, the MSC will send a proper error message to the SMS-GMSC.
Function of SMS-GMSC When receiving a short message TPDU from the SC, SMS-GMSC is responsible for the following: receiving short message TPDU; checking parameter; returning an appropriate error message to the SC in the error report (if the parameter is wrong); obtaining the routing information of a short message from the HLR; transferring the TPDU to MSC (If HLR does not indicate any errors); informing the HLR when the message is successfully sent or received from the MSC.
Function of SMS-IWMSC When the TPDU is received from the MSC, the SMS-IWMSC is responsible for the following operations: receiving short message TPDU; establishing a connection with SC when needed; sending a short message TPDU to the SC (when the address of SC is effective); sending a short message TPDU about the report when it is received from the SC. When in the situation of reporting, SMS-IWMSC continues to be responsible for transmitting the report to the MSCO.
When the information of report hasn't been received in a desired time from SC, or the SC address is invalid, the SMS-IWMSC is responsible for the following operations: sending the fault report back to the MSC; sending an appropriate error message with the timer value depending on the protocol between the SC and the SMS-IWMSC.
When it receives a warning from the HLR, then the SMS-IWMSC is responsible for the following operations: The function of SGSN When receiving the short message TPDU from the SMS-GMSC, the SGSN performs the following actions: receiving a short message according to the data unit of the transfer ring protocol; reporting an appropriate error message to SMS-GMSC if the SGSN detects an error; sending a short message to the MS if the SGSN does not detect any errors; submitting a report information from the MS to the SMS-GMSC using the delivery system when it receives a confirmation message. When receiving a failure report of the short message that is transferred to the MS, it sends the corresponding fault information back to SMS-GMSC.
C. Flow and Procedure of our Protocol
We discuss the part of bootstrapping firstly. As we know, building a general secret without an online method is a safe way of communication (for example, in a private way). Usually a block cipher is used here, which is also supported by the framework of SMSCrypto. Also, building a safe connection channel based on the asymmetric ciphers is permissible for users. First, the users require confirming the public keys for each other. Then they can communicate with each other safely by this method. Our protocol does not use the common approach of transferring and downloading certificates, and it uses the non-certificate BSS scheme BDCPS. Note that a traditional PKI needs a CA which can be totally trusted, as well as the online service. In contrast, BDCPS needs a semi-trusted module which can be called as Ticket Booth. Like the name, tickets are generated by this module. In this module, the users can sign up with their usually public keys. For each user, this procedure is needed only once, for example, when the registration starts in the system. The public parameters are contained in this BDCPS system particularly.
The detailed process is as follows. We consider how to calculate the identity-based pair of private keys and public keys by the public parameters concerned by our protocol.
1. Choosing the password, as well as a random value seed 2. For user A, calculating the secret information 3. Calculating the partial public key 4. Sending and the identifier ID of A to the Ticket Booth 5. Computing is the partial private key of the identity-based scheme. Note that the private key plays a role of "ticket" aiming to confirm the whole private key of A. The ticket booth has no knowledge about this private key. The coherence of the ticket is figured out by A through confirming that ( ) = . 6. The whole private key pair has the form of ( ) * . Its public key has the form of ( ) . Note that and . A chooses the number randomly. The above steps can be presented as Figure. 4. The identity-based pairs of the private key and the public key can be calculated by the users with the following known parameters.
As we mentioned before, the key module of our protocol is the Ticket Booth, which is a semi-trusted center. Unlike common PKI, our protocol does not need a fully trusted and online CA. The users can use the "tickets" generated by the "Ticket Booth" to sign the classical public keys. For each user, this operation is needed only once. For example, one can finish this operation when having the first registration in the system. We describe the parameters related to our schemes as follows.  is a pairing algorithm which is calculable, efficient, and without degenerating.
From Figure 4 , the interactions between the "Ticket Booth" and the user-end are shown explicitly. The main function of this procedure is helping the module to confirm the whole public key ( ) through calculating the following expression:
. Note that the order of requires to be examined whether it equals to n or not. That is , and . Also we need to check if is equal to . Usually, has an order of and a degree of k. is a multiple of n and a modified d. The public key decides the storage by the following expression:
For example, the curve of MNT4 has d = 2 and k = 4. Therefore, the public key of the MNT4 curve is 14 bits. Another example is the BN curve, with d = 6 and k = 12. So it takes the public key of 30 , where means the same security level.
D. Process of Point-To-Point Service for Short Messages
We introduce the process of the service for point-topoint short messages, including three main steps.
1. The end of the mobile station process of short message service consists of two operations: the transmission of information and status report from SC to MS; returning the result to SC. 2. The beginning of the mobile station process of short message service contains two operations: the transmission of information from MS to SC; returning the result to MS. 3. This step is the transmission of the warning information, which includes all the necessary operations of the reminding services from HLR or VLR to SC.
IV. PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the performance and the security margin of our protocol. We analyze our protocol from the experimental aspects and then analyze the results. We focus on the variables and parameters related to the CPU processor of the smart phone, the number of required SMS short messages, and the storage requirement. We take the experiments on different platforms of mobile phones, including on the Java-based Nokia N76, the Android G14 and the iPhone 4s. Table 1 introduces the different system parameters for the three different mobile phones we use in our experiments. Obviously, the Nokia N76 has the lowest configuration, while the G14 and the iPhone 4s have closer configurations.
We can evaluate our protocol from the point of symmetric algorithms, public key algorithms and signature encryption. In Table 2 , we give the results of communication costs for transferring a short message by the block ciphers. As the major implementation of symmetric algorithms, the block cipher can guarantee the authentication, integrity and the confidentiality. In this case, our protocol adds the authentication tag and the initialization vector to the source of transmission. For the phone of N76, this takes 31.7% of the size of SMS message at most. For the phone of G14, this takes15.6% of the size of SMS message for both authentication tag and encryption, and takes 23.9% at most. For the phone of iPhone 4s, this takes13.9% of the size of SMS message for both authentication tag and encryption, and takes 21.4% at most.
The cost of storage requirement can be adjusted corresponding to the need for different applications. Table 3 gives the results of storage requirements for different platforms of the tested phones using block ciphers. According to the results, we can conclude that the block ciphers are proper to even the SIM card. The cost is the most expensive for the phone of G14, requiring 312 bytes of RAM and 3 KB of ROM. For various lengths of messages (from 64 to 128 bytes), the performance of the symmetric algorithms are as Table 3 . Nowadays, the applications of mobile phones are becoming more and more. Short Message Service (SMS) plays an important role since it is simple for sending and receiving messages at the client end. Many transmission protocols are proposed to guarantee efficient and safe delivery of the SMS messages. According to the literature, some of these protocols are constructed from block ciphers, while others are constructed on public key infrastructure and signature encryption. But these protocols do not possess enough efficiency and security level. For the protocols having better performance, the security margin is usually limited in the application. For the protocols much safer than others, the efficiency is usually lower. In this paper, both the advantages and disadvantages of some existing protocols are investigated. A new protocol is proposed based on the research for safe delivery of SMS messages. The components and the structure of our protocol are improved based on previous framework. It can guarantee both the performance and the security level, possessing amore convenient realization.
Compared with other protocols with similar performance, our protocol is more secure. In our protocol, the signature model does not require the on-line PKI, which improves the efficiency. In the end, the experiments on three different mobile phones are carried on to confirm our conclusion about the protocols. The experimental results are analyzed.
